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Abstract - Contrary to previous literature, we show that the assignment of authority 
decision matters in optimal contract design with bilateral specific self-investments. This is 
the case when we enlarge the set of the states of nature, to explicitly consider the event that 
a party's market option turns out to be binding ex-post. We show that, under this setting, 
simple contracts protected by specific performance remedies may generate hold-up and 
thus parties' incentives to under-invest. However, investment efficiency is enhanced when 
authority is assigned to the party with ex-post binding market option. Our results suggest a 
neglected rationale for vertical integration as a remedy against hold-up.   
 
 
 JEL-Classiﬁcation: K12, L22, J41, C70.  










Antonio Nicita, Dept. of Economics University of Siena, nicita@unisi.it  
 
Simone M. Sepe, University of Arizona, J.E. Rogers College of Law, 
Simone.Sepe@law.arizona.edu 
 1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the role of ex-post market options on hold up and
incentives to invest, within an incomplete contract framework, sustained by
bilateral speciﬁc investments and based on optimal contract design.
The literature on the hold-up problem has played a major role in our un-
derstanding of the dynamics of institutions. The boundaries of ﬁrms and
the performance of hybrid governance systems, the role of the allocation of
ex-post decision rights (authority) as alternative tools to enhance investment
e ciency relative to a bilateral trade, have been deeply analyzed under the
lens of the incomplete contracts literature (Williamson (1985, 1996, 2005),
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995)). One important result of standard literature
is that, under incomplete contracts, ’authority matters’, as having ex-post
decision rights induces right-holders to optimally invest, while non-owners
will under-invest.
Another stream of literature has focused on mechanism design as a way
to overcome the hold-up problem through simple contractual mechanisms
(Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Chung (1991), Rogerson (1992), Edlin
and Reichelstein, 1996). The main result reached by this approach is that, in
a bilateral relationship sustained by speciﬁc self-investments, an implemen-
tation mechanism could be designed so as to perfectly align both parties’
incentives toward e cient investment levels. An important consequence is
that the allocation of ex-post decision rights is irrelevant in order to obtain
the ﬁrst best.
One common feature of the above approaches is the exclusive focus on bi-
lateral trade situations, where the outside market is taken as exogenously
given. One limitation of these approches, is that in real world trading ex-
changes, the degree of speciﬁcity and the relevance of hold-up rest pretty
much a matter of contract-market interactions, rather than the exogenous
result of a ’technological’ constraint, as generally depicted in the literature
(Spulber, 2002, 2009).
However, as Ishiguro (2009) recently pointed out, the above approaches “have
ignored the interactions between the holdup problem in a bilateral trade
and the market environments which govern the processes of arriving trading
opportunities such as how trading parties ﬁnd alternative partners when
current negotiation fails”. The main consequence is that the analysis of how
the holdup problem a ects and is a ected by market competition and trading
processes in markets, is still in its infancy (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993;
1Edlin and Hermalin, 1998; de Meza and Lockwood, 1998; Felli and Roberts,
2002; Chatterjee and Chiu, 2007; Nicita and Sepe, 2010).
In this paper we make a ﬁrst step to ﬁll this gap, by studying the impact of
a unilateral market option in an incomplete contract sustained by bilateral
speciﬁc self-investments. In particular, we focus on the ’Chung-ADR’ con-
tractual framework (Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994)),
based on speciﬁc performance protection as parties’ default option in the
renegotiation game.
We show that the existence of a market option for one party a ects parties’
incentives towards e cient investments unless ex-post decision rights are
given to the party whose market option is binding. Thus, we argue that,
when the states of nature a ecting the market environment are taken into
account, authority matters. Speciﬁcally, we argue that, in the framework
we study, authority should be given to the party less speciﬁc ex-post, a
conclusion which reverses some of the lessons derived by both the property
rights approach and the mechanism design approach.
Our conclusion may provide new insights towards another rationale – beside
traditional ones - for having (quasi)vertical integration under incomplete con-
tracts: vertical integration may derive from the necessity to gain full control
of a counterpart’s market option. A motivation which is independent of the
’internal’ incentives towards hold-up, depending on the realization of (the
degree of) market competition. We leave this further explorations to future
research.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relevance of the
ex-post market environment in an incomplete bilateral trade sustained by
speciﬁc investments. In section 3, we extend the Chung-ADR, introducing
the case of a seller’s market option and obtaining our main results. In section
4, we brieﬂy discuss the results and conclude.
2 Motivation
Let ask why should it be relevant to study the interactions between the hold-
up problem in a bilateral trade and the market environments where trading
parties may ﬁnd ex-post alternative partners. A ﬁrst answer relies on the
circumstance that, being the degree of speciﬁcity determined by the ex-post
rate of asset redeployability outside the relationship, this degree could be
endogenous rather than exogenous, depending on the evolution of trading
opportunities. Thus, for any given investment choice, what is ’speciﬁc’ at t0
2may become ’generic’ at t1 and vice-versa, simply because parties’ market
opportunities may change meanwhile. From one side this mitigates the hold-
up problem, as the degree of speciﬁcity faced by investors today may be
reduced ex-post as the market for speciﬁc inputs expands. From the other,
hold-up could be well the result of a market shrinkage, independently of the
technological nature of the investment made.
Let us report one nice example, among other, where ex-ante non-contractible
speciﬁc investments on the seller’s side turned out to create a new dedicated
demand ex-post. Early in 90’s Industrial Light & Magic (ILM) was a lead-
ing company specialized in motion picture visual e ects, among which Star
Wars, Star Trek, Terminator. Silicon Graphics Inc. was a maker of high-end
graphics workstations. Silicon Graphics Inc. signed an agreement with In-
dustrial Light & Magic to use its graphics computers to create the dinosaurs
for Jurassic Park. As Shapiro and Varian (1999) refer, Silicon Graphics
“hoped to showcase its workstations and spur future sales”. Since a SGI
Crimson system with the three-dimensional ﬁle system navigator appeared
in the 1993 movie Jurassic Park, for eight consecutive years, all ﬁlms nomi-
nated for an Academy Award for Distinguished Achievement in Visual E ects
were created on Silicon Graphics computer systems. Thus what was initially
a speciﬁc investment made by Silicon Graphics, turned out soon to ’create’
a market, reducing, in fact, the degree of speciﬁcity ex-post.
Shapiro and Varian (1999) report many cases in which initial speciﬁc invest-
ments in the ICT sector turned out to create a standard or at least to induce
additional demand. These authors actually point out that making speciﬁc
investments toward a ’big’ counterpart may generate one side the risk of ’in-
ternal’ hold-up, but on the other they can also spur sales, when it is possible
’to capture valuable business from others who will pay a premium for your
products’. Of course, the opposite it is also true: a generic investment may
turn out to become speciﬁc, if ex-post the market shrinks or is monopolized.
In the Microsoft II case in Europe, many software developers alleged that
the bundling of Windows Media Player with Windows PC OS would have
obliged them to produce only programs speciﬁc to Windows PC OS, as the
e ect Microsoft market foreclosure. Thus, in this case, it was the reduction
of market opportunities that a ected the degree of asset speciﬁcity, rather
than the opposite.
Beside the ICT markets, the relevance of market evolution for our under-
standing of the hold-up problem seem having characterized actually even
the well-known and highly debated textbook case referred to the Fisher
Body/General Motors merger. A full understanding of that case should in-
deed take into account the huge and unexpected explosion of new demand
3for closed bodies before the merger.
In 1919, Fisher Body signed with General Motors a ten-year term contract for
the supply of closed metal auto bodies, containing several provisions aimed
at protecting Fisher Body against hold-up by General Motors. A ﬁrst safe-
guard was given by a de facto exclusivity clause which obliged GM to buy
all of its closed metal auto bodies from Fisher. Moreover, the contract de-
ﬁned a pricing formula for auto bodies based on a cost-plus rule according
to which the ﬁnal price was determined by labor and transportation costs
plus a mark-up to cover capital costs. Other two contractual clauses (most-
favored nation clause and meeting-competition clause) were aimed at pre-
venting Fisher Body from exploiting its contractual power against General
Motors. Between 1919 and 1924, however, the market registered a huge and
unforeseen change in demand: wooden bodies were rapidly replaced by metal
auto bodies, where the Fisher brothers were the market leaders. This exoge-
nous change in the nature of demand for automobile bodies contrasted with
the original pricing provisions contracted upon by General Motors and Fisher
Bodies that proved to be too high for metal bodies. Fisher Body refused to
renegotiate the pricing formula and to satisfy General Motors’ request to
locate Fisher plants next to its plants, so as to reduce transportation costs
at least.
According to Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), this refusal to renegoti-
ate constituted a hold-up behavior by FB. Some recent articles1 have deeply
contrasted the traditional explanation of FB/GM vertical integration. Ac-
cording to Coase (2000, 2006), the real story of FB/GM was rather di erent:
(i) what FB acquired in 1926 was the 40 percent share of FB’s shares that
it did not already own, having acquired 60 percent of FB’s shares in 1919;
(ii) FB did not locate its plants far away from GM’s assembly plants. As a
consequence, in Coase’s view “there is no evidence that hold-up occurred”.
On the same lines Freeland (2000) has observed that ’the contractual prob-
lems that GM and Fisher experienced in 1924 [...] were directly linked to
the possibility of the Fisher brothers’ departure and had nothing to do with
Fisher taking advantage of the cost-plus pricing clause in the existing con-
tract”. Freeland (2000) in particular stresses the relevance of “GM’s desire
to prevent competitors from using Fisher’s services” as one of the main fac-
tors inducing the complete acquisition of FB: “These fears were magniﬁed
in mid-1919, when Fisher obtained its largest order for closed bodies ever
from Ford. Fearing that Ford was experimenting with closed bodies on the
1Casadeus-Masanell and Spulber (2000), Coase (2000, 2006), Freeland (2000), Nicita
and Sepe (2010).
4inexpensive Model T, GM management worried that they were about to fall
further behind their primary competitors in an important strategic area”.
Thus, the empirical test of fact-ﬁnding on the General motors/Fisher Body
saga, suggests that, in fact, at the origin of the merger there was the cir-
cumstance that the degree of speciﬁcity of Fisher Body, and mainly of Fisher
brothers, decreased over time as the market for closed body cars exploded,
enhancing then the market opportunities of the Fisher brothers.
The examples we mentioned above, simply suggest that many real trade sit-
uations hardly take place on a dichotomic environment, with either (full)
generic or (full) speciﬁc investments. As Williamson (2005) ﬁnally recog-
nised, asset speciﬁcity is a matter of degree as “the key factor in determining
whether a large numbers supply condition will evolve into a bilateral exchange
relation is the degree to which the transaction in question is supported by
durable investments in transaction-speciﬁc assets”. Spulber (2009) recently
argued that what really makes an investment transaction-speciﬁc is not de-
ﬁned by the properties of its capital equipment or human capital, rather it
depends on the buyer’s and seller’s ability to change actual trading partners.
The way in which actual and potential market opportunities could be ex-
plored and taken, clearly a ects parties’ bargaining power in a contract and
thus parties’ incentives to invest.
This means, in turn, that, under an incomplete contract, the analysis of
the impact of post-contractual market opportunities on parties’ incentives,
is crucial for a full understanding of the hold-up problem. This particularly
holds when assessing the optimality features of the remedies, contractual
mechanisms and organizational designs that parties may adopt to deter hold-
up and, consequently, under-investment choices.
In this paper we make a ﬁrst step to ﬁll this gap by investigating the role
of the ex-post realization of unilateral market opportunities within the op-
timal contract design framework deﬁned by Chung (1991) and Aghion, De-
watripont and Rey (1994), which is a degenerated case of the environment
analyzed by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
The Chung-ADR contractual scheme assumes that one party (say the buyer)
is the residual claimant of the relationship and that parties may choose the
initial allocation so as to give the other party (the seller) the right incentives
to invest. The initial allocation involves a positive level of trade so as to
make it costly for the seller to underinvest. Given that the seller is induced
to make the e cient investment, the buyer - who is the residual claimant -
will also invest e ciently. The ﬁrst best investment levels will be therefore
implemented. This outcome is reached, regardless of the allocation of the ex
5post decision rights.
We depart from the Chung-ADR contractual scheme, by introducing another
form of uncertainty, beside that a ecting ’internal’ gains from trade. Specif-
ically, we explicit the uncertainty over the market environment which a ects
trading parties’ opportunity to ﬁnd ex-post alternative valuable partners, at
the time when renegotiation occurs.
It turns out that such an extension dramatically a ects the optimality fea-
tures of the Chung-ADR contractual scheme. We consider the case in which
the ﬁxed claimant party - assumed to be the seller - has an ex-post bind-
ing market option. We characterize this as a random contract that a new
buyer propose to the seller, asking for a greater quantity than that assured
by speciﬁc performance.
A ﬁrst result we obtain is that the existence of an ex-post market option
on the seller’s side (ﬁxed claimant), induces a failure of the Chung-ADR
contractual scheme: the seller will over-invest and the buyer will under-invest.
Moreover, there is no contractual mechanism which may induce parties to
restore e cient investments, relative to the contract.
This means that, once we remove from the standard contractual framework
the assumption that outside markets are exogenously given, there is at least
a case where hold-up may still occur, inducing the vulnerable party to under-
invest.
A second result we reach is that an appropriate allocation of the ex post
decision rights may deter a party’s under-investment and mitigate the other
party’s over-investment, thus increasing overall e ciency. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that when the party with ex-post binding market option is the ﬁxed
claimant party, then it is e cient to revert the allocation of ex-post decision
rights.
We then conclude, that under a unilateral market option, it is always e cient
to assign the ex-post decision rights to the party for which the market option
esists, i.e. to the party less speciﬁc ex-post. This is a quite important result,
as it reverses one of the main conclusion reached by the mechanism design
approach to incomplete contract: ’authority’ - i.e. the allocation of ex-post
decision rights - matters for e ciency even under an optimal contract design,
once we extend our institutional environment in order to take into account
contract-market interactions.
63 The Model
The contractual environment we study involves two parties, a buyer and
a seller, assumed to be risk neutral. In order to generate a joint surplus,
parties have to make ex-ante speciﬁc (self)investments, under an uncertain
environment. Since investments are observable but unveriﬁable, parties can
agree ex-ante only on a contractual scheme involving a default option and a
renegotiation procedure. The default option implies a speciﬁc performance
remedy over a pair of quantity and price levels. The renegotiation procedure
is shaped as a bargaining game with outside options, alternate o ers, and
penalities such as to induce parties to reach an immediate equilibrium in the
ﬁrst stage.
As a consequence, in the renegotiation game, the proponent has all the bar-
gaining power over the renegotiation surplus and the respondent has the right
either to accept, or to enforce the speciﬁc performance, or to go to the next
round, where she will be the proponent. As the random variable is revealed,
a ecting the buyer’s value and the seller’s cost, parties may renegotiate on
agreed upon terms whenever it is ex-post e cient.
3.1 Basic Framework
Our basic framework refers to the Chung-ADR contractual scheme. Two
agents, the buyer (B), and the seller (S) sign an incomplete contract over
a bilateral trading relationship, which deﬁnes parties’ default options and
a renegotiation procedure. Ex-ante maximization of joint surplus requires
parties to make bilateral speciﬁc self-investments, equal to i   I   R+ for
the buyer and , j   J   R+ for the seller. Investment decisions occur at t1
in an uncertain environment, as the value and cost functions, respectively, of
the buyer and the seller, are only known ex-post. At t2, after the investments
are made, uncertainty is solved by the realization of a random variable  1  
 1   Rn, where  1 is a compact set describing all the contingencies related
to the ’contract’.
Contractual timeline is as following: parties meet at t0 and sign a simple
contract   which deﬁnes default options and the renegotiation game; bilateral
investment are chosen at t1, whereas the realization of a  C occurs at t2 ; trade
occurs only once and takes place no sooner than t3, with t3 >t 2 >t 1 >t 0.
After t2 and before t3 renegotiation may take place.
The simple contract   is a pair (q,t) 1  1, of quantity q   [0,qmax] and
transfer t   R+, with     [0,qmax]   [R+]. The information structure is
7mutual knowledge. In particular, investments (i,j) are observable but non-
contractible; parties know the distribution of  1, F( 1), and its support  1.
Thus, the contract   cannot directly specify investment targets, nor can
it make trade contractually contingent upon the realization of the random
variable  1. The gross monetary beneﬁt to the buyer is given by v(q, 1,i),
whereas the gross monetary cost to the seller is given by c(q, 1,j), where
v(.) and  c(.) are concave and twice di erentiable in all arguments, with
v(.) >c (.),   1    1. That means that trade is always desirable.
Parties investment cost functions are hB(i) for the buyer and hS(j) for the
seller, which are assumed to be convex. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities-
for the buyer and the seller are given, respectively, by:
UB( ,i, 1)=v(q, 1,i)   tq   hB(i) (1)
US( ,j, 1)=tq   c(q, 1,j)   hS(j) (2)
As it is standard to assume in the related literature, vqi > 0, cqj < 0,
v(0, 1,i) = 0, c(0, 1,j)=0 , and Inada conditions hold.
Following the Chung-ADR contractual scheme, we assume that parties can
design a ’speciﬁc performance’ contractual mechanism which speciﬁes the
’default option’,  (q,t), that parties can individually enforce at the renego-
tiation stage. Once  1 is realized at t2, a renegotiation game, RG, starts: in
stage 1, one party, say the buyer, can make an o er (q,t) to the seller; in stage
2, the seller either accepts the o er, inducing a trade to take place at these
terms, or rejects it. When the o er is rejected, either the default contract  
is enforced or another bargaining round starts, in which the proponent and
the respondent switch their roles. At each round of the renegotiaton game,
parties incur in a loss given by the depreciation of the collaterals, o ered as
’contractual hostages’ (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994).
An important result of such literature is that this mechanism implements
the ﬁrst best. Let us deﬁne r( ,RG) the contractual scheme which includes
the default contract  (q,t), and a renegotiation game RG which gives the
buyer all bargaining power ( =1),     [0,1]. The buyer thus has the ex-post
decision rights over the renegotiation game and can make a take-it-or-leave-it
o er to the seller; the seller has the right to accept it, either to reject and
obtain the speciﬁc performance, or to go for the next renegotiation round,
when she will be the proponent, and so on. A straighforward application
of the Nash bargaining solution with alternate o ers and outside options
to this game (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990), implies that an equilibrium
will be reached immediately at the ﬁrst stage, with the respondent (the
seller) obtaining his outside option (the agreed upon default option  (q,t))
8and the proponent (the buyer) being the residual claimant over the entire
renegotiation surplus.
Proposition 1
Under the contractual scheme r( ,RG) the equilibrium pair investments are
the ﬁrst best levels (ie,je)=( i ,j ) .
For a formal proof see Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994).
The intuition for the proof works as follows. We are interested in showing
that, given the ex-post ﬁnal allocation [(q(i,j, 1),t(i,j, 1)] at t3, the e cient
Nash equilibrium investments (ie,je) are those which maximize the buyer’s
and the seller’s utilities, i.e. (i ,j ).









d   c(q
d, 1,j)
 
dF( 1)   hS(j)=j
  (3)
where (qd,t d) are the default values agreed upon by parties at t0. By the
implicit function theorem it is possible to express je as a continuous function
of q, obviously with dj e/dqd > 0. Since j(0) = 0 and j(qmax) >j  , the
intermediate value theorem assures that there exists a value q such that
je(q)=j .
Deﬁning US the seller’s ex-ante reservation utility, it is possible to ﬁnd a
transfer t such that tq   c(q, ,j )   hS(j )=US. Thus the default con-
tract  (q,t) assures that the seller will select the e cient speciﬁc invest-
ment. Choosing a proper initial quantity will ensure that the seller mantains
the right ex ante incentives to invest, solving thus one side of the hold-up
problem.
The other side is solved by the assumption made on the renegotiation game,
which allocates all the bargaining power to the buyer. The buyer’s problem
then becomes:
Max  [v(q, 1,i)   tq   hB(i)] (4)
s.t. tq   c(q, 1,j)   hS(j)   tq   c(q, 1,j)   hS(j)=US
Then the value ie that solves (3) is such that ie = i .
In other terms the buyer is the residual claimant over the renegotiation sur-
plus RS, which is deﬁned as follows:
9RS(q, 1,i,j)=v(q
 , 1,i)   c(q
 , 1,j)   [v(q, 1,i)   c(q, 1,j)] (5)
Given RS, the buyer’s utility could also be written in the following way:
UB( , 1,i)=v(q, 1,i)   tq +  RS(q, 1,i,j)   hB(i). (6)
where     [0,1] is the buyer’s bargaining power. In the Chung-ADR frame-
work, being   =1 , the buyers is residual claimant in the compact set  1.
Since the structure is symmetric, the same argument applies to the inverted
case where the seller acts as a residual claimant. An interesting feature of
the Chung-ADR contractual scheme, is the irrelevance result concerning the
allocation of ex-post decision rights as a condition to induce e cient invest-
ments: it does not matter who has the authority, it is only necessary that
one side is residual claimant whereas the respondent has a binding default
option in the renegotiation game.
3.2 Contractual Design with Unilateral Market Option
The Chung-ADR framework is generally focused on the analysis of the impact
of uncertainty on contractual gains from trade, i.e. on parties’ internal gains
from contracting with the counterpart. It is generally assumed that such
uncertainty never entails parties opportunities outside the contract. Here
we remove this assumption, so as to include in the states of nature, also
the changes occured in parties’ market opportunities, after investments are
made.
We are then interested in analyzing how the introduction of ex-post market
opportunities in the Chung-ADR framework, a ects the optimal contract
design and thus parties’ incentives to select e cient investment levels.
Let us assume that, in the above framework, where the seller is the ﬁxed
claimant party and the buyer is the residual claimant one, a market option
exists for the seller.
We deﬁne the seller’s market option as a new market opportunity revealed
at t2, after investments are made. The seller’s market option depends on the
realization of a random variable  2    2   Rm, which completely describes
all the possible market opportunities for the seller, after investments are
made. For simplicity’s sake we assume that Cov( 1, 2)=0 .
10One way to ﬁgure out the case of the seller’s market option is another buyer
asking ex-post for a quantity q( 2) > q at a price t( 2). Given the speciﬁc
performance rule, which allows the buyer to enforce at any time the default
contract  , the residual quantity that the seller could switch to third parties
in the market is given by q( 2) q. Thus the seller’s market opportunity   XS
generates a random contract  ( 1, 2).
As a consequence, a market option for the seller does exist if and only if:
(i) the market opportunities require a quantity exceeding the default level
 2 : q( 2) > q, and (ii) the market transfer, t( 2) is such that the extra net
utility of the seller due to her market opportunity is greater than zero. In
other words, since the seller has a granted default option, the market option
should allow her to gain a pair (q,t) which generates an extra rent relative
to the contract. The information structure over  2 is common knowledge,
parties know the distribution of  2, F( 2), and its support  2.
Let us deﬁne the value of the market opportunity as following.
Lemma 1
The seller’s market option identiﬁes the seller’s extra net utility exceeding
the parties’ default option. It is given by:
  XS = Max{0;[t( 2)[q( 2)   q]   [c(q( 2), 1,j]   c(q, 1,j)]} (7)
Proof
It is strightforward to see that, given the seller’s default option, XS(q, 1, 1,j)
could never be lower than zero, i.e. it could never transfer to the seller a net
utility lower than the one the seller would have obtained by serving the orig-
inal buyer. Any value exceeding the default option (the seller would have
obtained within the contract and has to paid to the buyer in case of contrac-
tual switch) constitutes the extra net utility generated by a sale of a quantity
[q( 2)   q] at a price t(q2).
 
We are interested in analyzing how the result of Proposition 1 is a ected by
the introduction of the seller’s ex-post market opportunity into the Chung-
ADR contractual scheme. Under the new framework the buyer’s utility and
seller’s utility become, respectively:
11UB( , 1, 2,i)=v(q, 1,i)   tq +  RS(q, 1,i,j)   hB(i) (8)
US( , 1, 2,j)=tq   c(q, 1,j)+XS(q, 1, 2,j)   hS(j) (9)
where   is deﬁned as follows.
Lemma 2
Given XS(q, 1, 2,j), under (8) and (9), the buyer’s bargaining power be-










It is straighforward to see that: (i) XS(q, 1, 2,j) being the new seller’ out-
side option, deﬁned as in (7), is greater than the seller’s default option,
thus reducing the buyer surplus when it is greater than zero; (ii) when
RS(q, 1,i,j)=  XS, the dimension of the seller’s outside option is such to al-
low the seller to extract all the renegotiation surplus, thus   =0 ; should the
seller decide to stay in the contract he will obtain a greater quantity at a lower
price than the one agreed upon (hold-up); (iii) when RS(q, 1,i,j) <   XS
the seller will prefer to sell the quantity [q( 2)   q] at a price t(q2) to ’the
market’, the speciﬁc peformance rule assures that the buyer will obtain the
default option; thus the buyer’s bargaining power could never be negative,
and     [0,1].
 
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2
Under any contractual mechanism r( ,RG), when a market option for the
ﬁxed claimant party exists: (i) the ﬁxed claimant will over-invest relative
to the contract; (ii) the residual claimant will under-invest relative to the
contract; and therefore (iii) the pair of e cient investments will never be a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
The proof is developed in three parts, considering the case of the seller being
the ﬁxed claimant party and consequently the buyer as the residual claimant.
12We will show ﬁrst, the seller’s over-investment and then the buyer’s under-
investment. Finally we will show an impossibility result for any simple con-
tract r to induce e cient bilateral investments when a market option for the
seller exists.
a) Seller’s over-investment
To show why the seller will over-invest relative to the contractual mechanism
r, when a market option for the seller exists, recall ﬁrst the benchmark case
with the seller’s investment equilibrium without market option. Recall that
from (3) we have:
j
e   argmaxj
ˆ
 1
tq   c(q, 1,j)dF( 1)   hS(j)=j   .
When a market option exists, the above equation becomes:
  j





[tq   c(q, 1,j)+xS(q, 1, 2,j)]dF( 1)dF( 2) hS(j)
(10)
Expanding   XS, and integrating over q the market option in di erential form,
the above equation becomes:
  j




 2  












 dF( 2)dF( 1) 
  hS(j) (11)
By optimality of j  and since   XS is not equal to zero wp1 then   je  = j . In















13Since, (i)  cq(y, 1,j) is increasing in j by assumption, and (ii) µA > 0 by
construction, then   je >j  . Thus the result of seller’s over-investment is
proven.
b) Buyer’s under-investment
Let us now show why the buyer will under-invest under r when a market
option for the seller exists. Recall the deﬁnition of the renegotiation surplus,
RS, in (4). While in the Chung-ADR scheme   is assumed to be equal to
1, being determined by the renegotiation procedure and independent of in-
vestments, default contract and random variable, here  (q, 1, 2,i,j)  [0,1]
is deﬁned as   = [RS(q, 1,i,j)   XS]/RS(q, 1,i,j). Also, recall the def-
inition of the set A in (13). The buyers’ equilibrium investment is given
by:





[v(q, 1,i)   tq +  (q, 1, 2,i,j)RS]dF( 2)dF( 1)
  hB(i)   i  (13)
Since i is argmax where   =1w.p.1 , here the buyer is state contingent
residual claimant. Indeed in the set A, with µA > 0,  < 1 always applies.
As a result, the buyer will under-invest, with ˆ ie <i  .
c) The impossibility result
We are now ready to prove the ﬁnal part of Proposition 2, showing that, under
any r when a market option for the seller exists, there is no equilibrium pair
with bilateral e cient investment levels. It is su cient to osberve that, in
our framework, the seller and the buyer mantain opposite incentives towards
the preferred level of the default value q which induces e cient investments.
As to the seller, in order to induce her to select j  when a market option
exists , parties should deﬁne a default quantity   q<q such that the argmaxj
of equation (12) is j . The existence of a level   q<q : ˆ je(  q)=j  is assured by
the implicit function theorem. Thus to induce an investment level j  on the
seller’s side, parties should decrease the default quantity in the contractual
scheme r, from q to   q. However, on the other side, having such   q does
increase the probability of having a binding seller’s market option, as the
14range of values q( 2)    q is greater than q( 2) q, which further exacerbates
the buyer’s incentives to under-invest.
As to the buyer, the only way for inducing the buyer to e ciently invest,
would be imposing a default quantity in the contract which reduces to zero
the probability of having a binding seller’s market option and to restore a
maximal buyer bargaining power,   =1 , i.e. to ﬁx the default option at its
highest level, q = qmax, which by Inada conditions is not sustainable as, in
the most favourable case, it generates no gains from trade.
 
An important result we introduce at this point refers to the intuition that,
under r, when a market option exists for a ﬁxed claimant party, by invert-
ing the assignment of ’authority’ in the previous contractual framework, we
may reduce distortion in investments. Thus, we conclude that, in our frame-
work, contrary to the Chung-ADR conclusion, authority matters for optimal
contract design.
Proposition 3
Under any contractual mechanism r( ,RG), when a market option exists for
one party, the assignment of ex-post decision rights to that party enhances in-
vestment e ciency relative to the contract.
In particular, (i) the ﬁxed claimant party will invest optimally; (ii) the resid-
ual claimant (with market option) will over-invest, relative to the contract;
however (iii) the residual claimant’s over-investment will be less severe than
in the alternative allocation of ex-post decision rights.
Proof.
To prove proposition 3, we ﬁrst consider the case analyzed in Proposition
2, where the seller is the ﬁxed claimant with market option and the buyer
is the residual claimant, and then compare those outcomes with the ones
obtainable through an inversion of the allocation of ex-post decision rights.
(i). It is easy to see that, when the buyer becomes ﬁxed claimant, he will
e ciently invest, as speciﬁc performance protection assures that no hold-up
may occur due to renegotiation, under a seller’s market option. Then, as
in Proposition 1, it is possible to choose q : ie(q)=i . Thus, compared to
proposition 2, in this case, shifting the ’authority’ would realign the buyer’s
incentives towards e cient investments.
15(ii). As to the seller, now being the residual claimant party with bargaining
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[tq   c(q, 1,j)+RS(q, 1,i,j)]dF( 2)dF( 1) 
hS(j), given that the seller’s bargaining power is equal to 1 and  cq(.) is
increasing in j, optimality for the seller implies ˆ je >j  , i.e. a seller’s over-
investment.
(iii). To obtain the result that seller’s over-investment is mitigated when
she is the residual claimant compared to the case when she acts as a ﬁxed
claimant (as in Proposition 2), let us recall ﬁrst the deﬁnition of the set A
















However, since A is reducing in q, we have that µB   µA (or B   A).
This means that the states of nature in which there is a realization of the
seller’s market opportunity are less likely, which, in turn, mitigate the seller’s
over-investment level.
 
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Proposition 2 shows how the two main results obtained by optimal contract
design (the so-called Chung-ADR framework) - i.e. (i) bilateral e cient in-
vestments and (ii) irrelevance of authority assignments - do not hold anymore
once we extend the complexity of the institutional environment faced by con-
tractual parties, so as to include potential contract-market interactions.
16We interpret this outcome as the consequence of shifting towards a more
realistic framework, the trade relationship analyzed. Besides the extreme
case of full asset speciﬁcity under a constant bilateral monopoly, there are
many intermediate cases in which the degree of speciﬁcity ultimately depends
on the evolution of the outside market. Apparently, established theories of
hold-up say nothing about these intermediate cases, where however the risk
of hold-up still exists and it is related to the contract-market interactions.
An interesting result we obtained in Proposition 2 is for instance the fact that
the party with outside opportunity may even over-invest even when she has
full contractual protection and no authority, while in the literature having
full contractual protection induces e cient investment, whereas having no
authority leads to under-investment.
The economic rationale for such a behavior has been clearly outlined by
Shapiro and Varian (1999) and Spulber (2002, 2009), according to whom the
ex-ante most vulnerable party in an incomplete contract may even over-invest
to ﬁnd new opportunities, signing multi-party contracts, precisely as a way to
’signal’ her ability to the market or to reduce counterpart’s post-contractual
opportunism.
Moreover we show that a potential hold-up, and thus actual under-investment,
may occur even under an optimal contract design when the party with speciﬁc
performance has a market option. This conﬁrms that hold-up and the degree
of asset speciﬁcity is a matter at the intersection between the technological
nature of the investment made and parties’ potential outside options.
The result we reach in proposition 3, outlines not only that ’authority mat-
ters’, but also provides an economic rationale for the direction of authority
assignment. Under unilateral market option, it is always e cient to assign
ex-post decision rights to party less speciﬁc ex-post, because speciﬁc perfor-
mance will assure e cient investments by counterpart.
This conclusion is relevant, in our view, for at least two reasons:
1. it reverses, under the new framework considered, the main results
reached by the property rights school (Hart, 1995) and by the mecha-
nism design literature;
2. it shows that having authority could not be enough to deter hold-up
when the counterparts has a market option, and that having the right
to speciﬁc performance may provide extra-incentives, so as to induce
over-investment.
17As a consequence, the e ciency of contractual remedies should not be eval-
ued per se, as if they occurred in a competitive vacuum, rather it should
be analyzed relative to the contract-market interactions. What the Fisher
Body/General motors story really tells us, is that the degree of co-speciﬁcity
changed as the market for the Fisher brothers’ human capital exploded. This
was actually the source of potential hold-up by Fisher Body.
However the direction of the merger was probably wrong. According to our
analysis economic e ciency would have required to assign ex-post decision
rights to the Fisher brothers rather than to General Motors, as Fisher broth-
ers had the human capital most demanded in the outside market. In fact,
one of the puzzling facts of the story is the circumstance that the Fisher
brothers continued to work for GM at the top executive level: Lawrence as
vice president and director; William as G.M. consulting executive; Alfred
as aircraft director; Edward as vice president, director of G.M. and general
manager of the Fisher Body division. Freeland (2000), noticing that GM was
even willing to continue to pay Fisher brothers’ gambling debts, deﬁned thus
the merger as “a case of hold-up through merger”.
What Freeland (2000) suggests is in fact that the merger was motivated
by the GM’s need to control the Fisher Body market option. Going back to
Proposition 3, this means that our result can provide insights towards another
explanation of vertical (quasi)integration, beside the standard one: a party
may be willing ot vertically integrate a counterpart when it is costly, in terms
of transaction costs, to design a contractual framework which internalizes
market externalities.
The circumstance that even the textbook case of hold-up reveals a strong role
for contract-market interaction in explaining hold-up (Nicita and Sepe, 2010),
suggests that a progress in this direction would allow to fully investigate the
complex dynamics between contractual governance and market competition.
Our analysis is just a ﬁrst step in this direction. A possible extension should
explore the case of bilateral market options and the role of authority assign-
ment in that case. Further analysis would require to consider, for instance,
the trade-o  between contractual mechanism which induce e cient invest-
ments relative to the contract, but decrease incentive to ’create’ new markets;
the case when both parties may have a market option; and the case when
information about market options is private information. In the ﬁrst case, we
refer to the idea that over-investment by the party with market option - as in
Proposition 2 and 3 - could be e cient from a welfare point of view, when it
creates new markets even when, looking exclusively to the contract surplus,
it appears to be a quasi-rent dissipation. In the second case, when both
18parties have a market option, the simple contract we refer to, could be just
a short term safeguard for parties waiting for better outside opportunities.
In the third case, when there is private information about the counterpart’s
outside opportunities, the renegotiation game should need to include a com-
plex mechanism of information revelation, as parties may cheat or blu  about
their real market opportunities ex-post.
In general, as the uncertainty over the market environment becomes relevant,
the contractual governance structure matters and one reason towards vertical
integration could be found, rather than in the protection of actual speciﬁc
investments, in the need to control an uncertain counterpart’s market option,
i.e. the countepart’s degree of ex-post speciﬁcity.
We believe that much more analysis is needed to investigate the consequences
of relaxing several of the assumptions which characterize the standard hold-
up models. This is left to future research.
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